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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONDEMNATION
CASES*
By MILTON K. HIGGINS
THE MOST UNIQUE ASPECT of federal government condem-
nation cases triable in the federal court of this state is now a
thing of the past. Before its recent amendment, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 81 (a) (7) specifically exempted from the opera-
tion of these rules all condemnation cases except as to appeals.
Consequently the federal condemnation cases tried in this state
came under the provisions of the following federal statute:
"The practice, pleadings, forms and modes of proceedings in
causes arising under the provisions of section 257 of this title
shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings,
forms and proceedings existing at the time in like causes in
the courts of record of the State within which such district
court is held, any rule of the court to the contrary notwith-
standing."1 (Emphasis supplied).
It was, of course, the intent of the Congress to favor owners
of property affected by federal condemnation proceedings by direct-
ing that the practice and similar matters would follow the pro-
cedure in the state courts with which counsel, naturally, would
be most familiar.
The actual result, however, probably failed to prove as satis-
factory as Congress had anticipated. The statute and the decisions
left it largely to the discretion of each federal judge as to how far
it was proper to follow the state rules of practice, forms, and so on.
No amount of research, especially in a state like ours where con-
demnation cases in the Federal Courts had been relatively rare,
could inform counsel for the landowners as to what was the prac-
tice in such cases in the Federal Court. The only sure method
was to ascertain the rulings of the particular federal judge pre-
siding in trials in which the client is interested. As a result the
reporter herein has sat through weeks of trial of the other fellow's
condemnation cases to obtain a better understanding of this dim
vista now to have the consequent conclusions wiped out by the
amendment of the rule.
The rule has been declared not to require the federal court
* This is the text of an address delivered at the 1954 meeting of the North Dakota
Chapter of the Order of the Coff.
** Of Higgins and Donahue, Bismarck, N. D.
1. 25 Stat. 357 (1888), 40 U.S.C. § 258 (1946). Procedure in condemnation
cases is now governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A.
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to apply the substantive law of the state, as careful perusal of the
statute indicates.2 This is applied to the measure of compensation.'
Nevertheless, there was plenty of room for uncertainty and
counsel sometimes complained that the federal judges in deter-
mining what was "near as may be" under this statute were as
poor judges of distance as the man who named "near beer."
But enough of the past. Under the new rule governing federal
condemnations a definite practice is established. One of the most
interesting provisions is that where the defendant landowner feels
he has no defense or legal objection to the taking of the property
involved (this covers 99.96 per cent of the cases) he is not required
to answer but is given the specific right to file a notice of appear-
ance which entitles him to full notice as to the time of trial and
also provides that at the trial he may present testimony as to the
damages suffered by reason of the taking by condemnation of his
property.4 This covers also severance or consequential damages
resulting to property retained by him.
Since the new rule became operative it has been our practice
not to file an answer but instead a notice of appearance. How-
ever, after consultation with the United States District Attorney and
with the Federal Judge and for the convenience of all concerned,
we expand the plain notice of appearance slightly to give it some
of the aspects of an answer. For instance, if the government takes
part of a farming unit, even though a portion of the land may lie
at a distance from that taken, it is our practice to state in the notice
of appearance that consequential damages will be asked for the
lands remaining, and to describe them, so as to give the government
fair notice and an opportunity to make their own estimate of such
damage.
Similarly, where the government, as in the condemnation of
lands for Garrison Reservoir above Sanish, is leaving the oil and
gas rights in the landowner, subject to certain restrictions such
as against pollution of reservoir water by prospecting for or pro-
ducing oil or gas, we state that consequential damages will be
claimed and if the ownership of the oil and gas is fractional, state
the amount of such fraction.
We do not state the amount of damages claimed in dollars in
any event. Strange as it may seem, the owner's estimate of the
2. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943)h Brown v. United States, 263
U.s. 78 (1923).
3. United States v. Miller, note 2, supra.
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A (e).
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value of his land, until he has had it examined and appraised by
experienced and professional appraisers, is often most uncertain.
It is quite a common thing where answers are filed by landowners
which commonly state the amount of damages claimed, to see
counsel put to the necessity of amending the figures upward to do
justice to his client in the light of later information obtained,
or conversely, to ask to lower the figure by amendment to avoid
antagonizing the jury by an estimate later found to be excessive.
As the only question remaining at the time such cases go to
the jury is the amount of damage, the order of proof is reversed.
The landowner is required to put on his evidence first and former-
ly had no inkling, in most cases, of what the government testimony
would be as to value until the close of his own case on direct.
In the last four years, however, the government has commonly
stated in the opening statement to the jury its contention as to
damages as to each tract, the cases usually involving ten to fifteen
tracts each. Ordinarily, however, the government does not disclose
such figures until the actual trial.
The task of'making a fair estimate as to the defendant's dam-
ages is further complicated by the fact that the owner is entitled
to the fair market value of the land at the time it is taken, not only for
the uses to which it was then being put but also the "highest and
most profitable and best use for which it was fitted in the reason-
ably near future". In one Hawaiian case it was held that evidence
was admissible to show that the highest and best available use of
the land was for raising sugar cane though water necessary would
have to come from lands owned by others and on which the owners
had no present claim.5
Spending a moment on the matter of severance damages,
Federal District Judge Charles Vogel, who has tried the majority
of cases involving recent land condemnations in this state, has
generally held that the owners could present testimony concern-
ing lands remaining in their ownership to show damages tn such
lands even though not contiguous with the lands being, taken,
provided the tracts had commonly been used together as a ranch-
ing or farming unit and evidence shows they were most useable
and valuable as such.6 There is a strong line of cases, however,
5. McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342 (1936).
6. Accord, City o( Stockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal. App. 760, 31 P.2d 467 (1934);
Duggan v. State, 214 Iowa 230, 242 N.W. 98 (1932).
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which hold that in order for severance damages to be allowable
the lands retained must be contiguous. 7
Always the chief, and usually the only, issue in these cases
is that of land values. The courts, frankly admitting the inade-
quacies of such measurements, have nevertheless held that fair
market value of land is the measure of damages for which the
government is liable.8 This is commonly defined as the price at
which the mind of the informed purchaser would meet with that
of the informed seller where neither is under compulsion to deal.
Many courts have frankly stated that this is a far from satisfactory
measure but the best one that has been evolved to date. It natur-
ally gives opportunity for wide diversity of opinions, especially
in applying the rule as to what is the best, most profitable avail-
able use of the property involved.
Along the Missouri River bottom lands the problem is further
complicated by the fact that many of these lands have not been
utilized until the recent discovery of the speed and economy with
which heavy tractors equipped with bulldozers could clear the
land of brush and trees up to about a foot in diameter. The diffi-
culty is that these bottom lands are quite unlike those nearby
but on higher ground from the standpoint of soil types and mois-
ture supply and the height of the water table. Further, most of the
lands have been held in the families of early settlers, handed down
from father to son or within the family, and very few of them have
been placed on the market for sale.
Sales of "comparable lands" which are usually those within the
same neighborhood and within a few miles of the land involved
in the valuation proceedings are common standards for valuation.
In order to get two or three of such "comparable sales" in these
cases it has been necessary at times to cover 50 or 60 miles of river
bottom lands.
One of the unusual phenomena in the government practice
of condemnation is the Judgment on Declaration of Taking. This
is based on a federal statute9 which provides that at or after the
commencement of condemnation case the authority taking the
land (in these cases the Secretary of War) after depositing in
court the amount of the value of the lands so taken, according
to the government estimate, may file such a Declaration signed by
7. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. By. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505,
57 P.2d 575 (1936).
8. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
9. 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. I 258a (1946).
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him which immediately transfers title to the government of the
property involved. On such a Declaration the federal district court
enters a Judgment on Declaration, which often causes considerable
consternation among landowners' counsel who are unfamilar with
this practice. They, of course, are immediately concerned with
availability and time for appeal and will find little light on the
topic in a short search of the statutes.
Actually, such judgments are interlocutory in nature and in
no way affect the right of the landowner to contest the government
valuation of his land. Under the statutes and the rules, the trial
court has the power to permit the landowner to apply for and
receive any part or all of the deposit as to his property. Common-
ly, 100 per cent of it is allowed to be withdrawn. The ultimate
determination of the value of the land awaits the trial of the case,
which may be months or years after the entry of Judgment on
Declaration. The government pays no interest on the amount
deposited but is required by statute to pay six per cent interest
on any amount contained in the verdict over the amount of the
government's deposit. There is, therefore, no occasion for an
appeal and none lies from the Judgment on Declaration.
Often it is actually a considerable assistance to the landowner
to have the deposit made and Judgment on Declaration entered.
The time of valuation is then fixed as of the time the Declaration
is filed. If he wishes the owner may withdraw the deposit and
use it to purchase replacement lands or otherwise, as he may see
fit. He does run the risk, however slight it may be, of being re-
quired to repay the government the difference should the jury
return a verdict for less than the amount of the government
deposit.1°
It might be fitting at this point to observe that a recent amend-
ment of the federal income tax statutes has simplified the re-
placement problem of the former owner. Formerly, where property
was taken by condemnation or sold under threat of condemnation
the landowner could set up a replacement fund under certain
restrictions from which he could purchase property similar to that
taken or sold without being liable for income tax on the gain
realized. The law in that event treated it as an exchange. To do
this he had to trace the funds from the sale to the new purchase.
Under the present law, however, this is not required and any
repurchase of similar lands made after certainty of condemna-
10. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1943).
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tion is apparent, beginning, we believe, with December, 1944, and
ending with the end of the tax year after the money is obtained
or deposited by the government, is considered as an exchange
and not taxable, provided the money was deposited or received
December 31, 1950. Further, it has been held that property
otherwise qualifying can be used as replacement even though it
is purchased on contract for sale which does not require pay-
ment within the period above stated.
Since these condemnation cases are per se and of necessity
problems of valuation, the considerations of valuation cases gen-
erally are applicable here. The somewhat artificial standards,
however necessary, adopted by the courts, make testimony on such
matters particularly difficult for inexperienced witnesses. While
the owners themselves are automatically qualified to give their
opinion upon values of the property, it does not necessarily
follow that such opinion will be very persuasive as far as the
jury is concerned. In most instances the owners have never been
in court before and virtually in every case never have never been
in court on a condemnation case. It therefore follows that the
most dependable testimony is usually that of a competent, ex-
perienced and professional appraiser with as much knowledge
of the particular locale involved as possible. Juries have repeat-
edly demonstrated in verdicts in these cases that such testimony
is most convincng to them. As a result it is not surprising if the
landowner may sometimes feel like the defendant in the criminal
case who on being offered counsel by the judge replied that
personally he would prefer a couple of good witnesses. If he
cannot have both competent counsel and competent witnesses that
would, perhaps, be the best choice in many cases.
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